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SUMMARY 
This study focuses on the role of the South African judiciary under 
an entrenched and justiciable Bill of Rights. 
The lack of an established human rights culture in South Africa results 
in uncertainty regarding the permissible extent to which judges are 
empowered, under the Bill of Rights, to employ judicial activism and 
creativity in order to protect the fundamental rights of citizens. 
Judicial activism is used in the sense that judges can and should, 
whenever expressly or impliedly sanctioned to do so by the Bill of 
Rights, ensure that the fundamental rights of the individual are 
protected to the extent of granting actual constitutional relief, where 
this is justified, instead of merely declaring the existence of a right. 
The essential aim of this study is to outline the parameters of, and 
the legal basis upon which judicial activism can be justified and 
accepted into a South African human rights culture. 
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INTRODUCTION 1 
Interpretation means to go beyond the natural vagueness, fuzziness and 
open texture of language, seeking the real dimensions of the 
interpretive question : the conflict between the plain literal meaning 
and background considerations, the existence of technical insufficiencies, 
incompleteness, inconsistencies or incoherences, the conflict between 
what the- -norm says and what the norm means within a certain 
interpretative siruation 1 • The starting point when interpreting a 
constitution is always to look at the written text itself, without 
bringing into the interpretation any pre-conceived notions of what a 
constitution should be like. However, in understanding the written text 
the interpreter must bring to bear upon the interprefari:Ton-- tile-entire 
conte-xtl.:fr:IC-experience and not merely -the-lffera-1 wording of the text. 
ihe interpreter in giving content to the constffutTon--hasto--make 
certain basic choices regarding the purpose and scope of the 
constitution. Dworkin in Law's Empire contends that to 'interpret ' a 
constitution, is to make the best thing of its kind that one believes 
it is capable of being. According to Dworkin therefore, the interpreter 
shOuld seek to understand the constitutional text in accordance with 
the interpreter's larger vision of what a good constitution should be 
like. The criticism of such an open perspective is that interpretation 
of the constitutional text may simply become a pretext for expressing 
one's own ideas of what the constitution should be.· The essential 
task of the interpreter is to give meaning to the consffti1tTOnai-te-xt-
and not to move outside the four corners of the text. One instance 
where this -dividing line between legitimate interpretation inside the four 
corners of the text, and illegitimate interpretation which goes beyond 
the text, becomes blurred, is the phenomena known as judicial 
activism. 
Within the context of Southern African constitutional law judicial 
activism can be defined as interpretation which is designed to ensure 1/ 
compliance with the values, norms, principles and constitutional relief 
not specifically mentioned in the constitutional text but which 
nevertheless form an integral part of the text by necessary implication. 
The task of constructing a rationally coherent interpretation calls for 
certain value commitments which involves a measure of subjectivism. 
However, theoretically the process is a detached and disinterested 
selection of values which the interpreter does not necessarily share or 
which he or she_ even rejects. The constitutional text itself should 
dictate the choice of values in that the interpreter should seek to 
make sense of the text in order to formulate a coherent, rational and 
justified result. In the exercise of this choice between values, the 
interpreter faces a conflict between legal certainty and the concrete 
Maccormack, D.N. Interpreting statutes (Aldershot, Dartmouth 
1991) • 34 
2 
justice of the case. Judicial activism is an essential comporient of ar1_y 
articulated interpretation in that it completes gaps in the Constitution 
and provides solutions to situations where there is no positive law 
defining constitutional remedies-. -All hara -- cases of C:fr)nstituflon~al 
·interpretatlon-··a-re characterised by the fact that an answer cannot be 
found in the mere wording of the constitutional text2 • A j~~t _solution 
to a hard case can not mean rigorously applying the words of the 
text, excluding its spirit. There must be room for creativity which is 
~ . . .. justified in terms of the function assigned to the judiciary under the 
South African Bill of Rights. Creativity is used in the sense of 
connoting a meaning which is consonant with the constitutional 
mandate of interpreting all law in terms of the 'spirit, purport and 
objects ' of the rights contained in Chapter 3 of the Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa Act3. In this study, the aforementioned 
type of interpretation will be referred to as 'functional creativity ' in 
the sense that judges have to respond to violations of fundamental 
rights in a creative and assertive manner and ameliorate potentially 
unjust situations brought about by human rights violations on the basis 
that the function of a judge under a bill of rights is first and 
foremost that of custodian of human rights. The concept of 'functional 
creativity' is the cornerstone of any interpretation of the South African 
Bill of Rights which aims at being a value-coherent and purposive 
interpretation, as opposed to an otherwise unjust and formal 
interpretation. 
The moment the decision goes beyond the lexical meaning of the 
text, one encounters the legal concept of gap-filling which does not 
strictly speaking fall within the definition of interpretation. In German 
constitutional law the distinction between interpretation and gap-filling 
is acknowledged, yet the notion of gap-filling is controversial and 
uncertain4 • Gaps do exist in constitutions and must be closed. The 
implementation of an 'articulated interpretation ' which cures any 
ambiguity, uncertainty and technical imperfections in the text can also 
solve the problem posed by textual gaps and is easier to justify than 
the controversial notion of gap-filling. An articulated interpretation which 
is justified by the interpreter in terms of why the chosen interpretation 
is to be preferred, rather than the other interpretive possibilities which 
would yield a different practical result, is essential. The interpretive 
2 
3 
4 
Maccormack, D.N. Interpreting Statutes (Aldershot, Dartmouth 
1991). 78 
Act 200 of 1993 (as amended). Hereinafter referred to as "the 
Constitution" 
Maccormack, D.N. Interpreting statutes (Aldershot, Dartmouth 
1991). 78 
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justification has to possess sufficient coherence and rationality so as 
to justify the interpretation on a substantive level. Such coherence 
would have to take into account the priority of a positive 
interpretation but at the same time allow for a progressive 
interpretation in terms of which social improvement is recognised as 
the objective of any constitution. At the same time must it be 
acknowledged that the Constitution attempts to foster a culture of 
justification in the sense that every exercise of power is expected to 
be justified, including the judicial exercise of power5 • 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTIFICATION FOR JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 
No legal instrument, however well drafted, is beyond the need for 
interpretation6 • The 1993 South African Constitution is no exception. 
It was produced after complicated negotiations involving diverse 
participants and is subject to ambiguities and uncertainties. The 
amalgamation of various party-political views into one multi-party 
Constitution increases the conceptual ambiguity of the constitutional 
provisions. The judiciary therefore is faced with the task of giving 
clarity, certaintvan-a- meaning to fne·- ·Constitution since ·many 
constitutional issues wrn ·· nof-be resOlvecroymere-lTilguistic analysis of 
the Constitution. A crucial question of interpretation is therefore to /.//.
1
) 
what extent judicial activism is sanctioned by the Constitution and in V 
particular, how wide the parameters of judicial activism are set by the · · 
Constitution itself. The judiciary must not alter the material of which 
the Constitution is woven, but they can and should iron out the 
creases7 • This means that in the interpretation of the Constitution any 
judicial activism must be grounded in the constitutional text itself and 
not go beyond the four corners of the text. 
Judicial activism, in order to be legitimate, must always adhere to 
the golden thread of accountability and justification which runs 
throughout the Constitution 8 • It is also important to understand that 
the rights and freedoms contained in the Constitution are not absolute 
as indicated by the limitation clause in the Constitution which results 
in a qualified commitment to the protection of human rights. The Bill 
of Rights therefore does not have the protection against legislative 
abuse of power as its only object, since the limitation clause 
introduces the fundamental notion of the interests of society as 
justification for the limitation of otherwise absolute human rights. The 
5 
6 
7 
8 
Mureinik, E. A bridge to where ? Introducing the Interim Bill of 
Rights (1994) SAJHR 31. 
Henkin L. The International Bill of Rights 1981. Preface. 
Denning The Discipline of Law. 12 
Mureinik, E •. A bridge to where ? Introducing the Interi'Jii Bill of 
Rights (1994) SAJHR 31. 
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qualified way in which human rights are guaranteed in the Constitution 
is an indication that judicial activism also has definite parameters. The 
strongest case against judicial activism is the fact that human rights 
are not absolute and therefore not conducive to absolute protection 
vis-a-vis judicial activism. 
In an attempt to set the judicial boundaries of creativity, and 
eliminate the potential for subjective design of the constitution, the 
drafters of the .. Constitution circumscribed a particular mode of 
interpretation9, as well as outlined most of the entrenched rights in 
the Constitution in very specific terms. The specification of a particular 
method of interpretation has a profound infruence on the scope for 
~dic1ara-C1:1vTsni-Ti1The sense that where the written law is clear and 
unambig-uous;- the only vehicle for judicial activism is that of 
interpretation. The interpretation designated by section 35 of the 
Constitution however, does not cause the function of the judiciary in 
terms of the Constitution, to be resolute and dogmatic. Section 35 
compels the judiciary in their interpretation of the Constitution, to have 
regard to public international law and the judiciary 'may ' have regard 
to comparable foreign case law. This leaves the judiciary with a wide 
and extended creative framework within which to apply the 
fundamental rights contained in Chapter 3 of the Constitution. The 
designation of a specific theory of interpretation however, also has a 
negative aspect. Reading things into a constitution in order to bring 
it into line with a theory of interpretation is no more defensible than 
reading things out of a constitution. An illustration of the last-
mentioned approach where things are read out of the constitution, is 
for instance where the interpreter chooses to ignore the narrow 
meaning of the literal wording of a particular constitutional provision, 
in order to assume an extended jurisdiction which allows for 
interpretation which is more consonant with the spirit as opposed to 
the letter of the constitution. Such an approach can be justified on 
the basis that a constitution should be considered in terms of our 
whole experience and not solely in that of what is said in the text. 
The drafters of a constitution were after all, framing the constitution, 
not painting its details beyond the need for human clarification and 
elucidation10 • 
Another equally important aspect of constitutional interpretation is the 
enforceability of the constitutional provisions. A bill of rights should 
contain effective constitutional remedies for the enforcement of the 
rights contained therein otherwise the bill of rights will amount to 
nothing more than a meaningless document consisting of empty 
political rhetoric11 • The judiciary therefore has an important role to 
9 
10 
II 
Section 35 of the Constitution. 
Tribe L.H. On reading the constitution. 1991 
cowling MG Judges and the Protection of Human Rights in South 
Africa : Articulating the Inarticulate Premise 1987 SAJHR 183. 
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play in that the abuse of fundamental rights can only be eradicated 
by a judiciary which ensures the judicial creation of constitutional 
remedies where no effective relief is otherwise available to the 
aggrieved party. The judiciary has an extended and creative framework 
within which to interpret and apply the Constitution under a system 
of judicial review12 • The process involves the weighing up of values 
and making of value-judgments which increase the possibility for the 
imposition of constitutionally sanctioned judicial activism and creative 
interpretation. 
Judicial assertiveness is also sanctioned by sections 35(1) and 35(3) 
of the Constitution which provides inter alia that a court of law 
'shall, where applicable, have regard to public international law 
applicable to the protection of the rights entrenched in [Chapter 3] ' 
and ' have due regard to the spirit, purport and objects of [Chapter 3] '. In 
this regard section 2(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights 13 provides that : 
'Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other measures, eac/J State 
Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in accordance 
with its constitutional processes and with the provisions of the present Covenant, to 
adopt sucl1 legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights 
recognized in the present Covenant '. 
This section outlines the important function of the legislature in giving 
effect to the rights contained in the Constitution by providing effective 
constitutional remedies to counteract the violation of protected rights 
and freedoms. This section is also premised on the principle that 
human rights are not strictly speaking legislated but are rather 
recognised by the legislature as inalienable guarantees of the civil 
liberties of the individual. A bill of rights is 'framed ' by its makers 
and not legislated as codified law which like all other statute law is 
subject to repeal once the purpose for which the statute was enacted 
has disappeared or the mores of society have changed. This means 
that the enactment of an instrument containing fundamental rights and 
freedoms is not the sole criterion by which to judge a country's 
commitment to human rights. A bill of rights is intended to serve as 
a declaration of the protection of human rights. It is not intended to 
conclusively legislate a codified impression of what the drafters' ideas 
on the possible parameters of human rights interpretation and judicial 
protection are, save to include a limitation clause to define the 
boundaries of the rights and freedoms. The limitation clause only 
specifies the permissible extent to which interference with fundamental 
rights is allowed, and does not in any way inhibit or limit the 
granting of judicial remedies once the violation of a fundamental right 
is shown on a balance of probabilities. The existence of effective 
12 
13 
Dugard J Statutory Interpretation as an Exercise in Choice 1978 
SALJ 451 ; Dugard Human Rights and the south African Legal order 
1987. 303. 
Adopted by General Assembly resolution 2200 A (XXI) of 16 
December 1966. 
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judicial remedies for the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms 
is more indicative of the country's concern for human rights in that 
the codified rights and freedoms are not complete and independent 
from their enforcement. In order to address the need for effective 
constitutional remedies, section 2(3) of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights provides : 
'Eac/1 State Party to the present Covenant undertakes : 
(a) To ensure that any person whose rigl1ts or freedoms as herein recognized are 
violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has 
been committed by persons acting in an official capacity ; 
(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto 
determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or by 
any other competent authority provided for by the legal system of tl1e State, and 
to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy (my emphasis} ; 
(c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when 
granted'. 
It is trite that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
is binding as international law and therefore in accordance with section 
35(1 l of the Constitution the courts are entitled to interpret the 
Constitution in such a way as to give expression to the international 
law contained in section 2(3) of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights which requires that an effective remedy be 
determined by a competent authority 'provided for by the legal system 
of the State ' and that the remedies granted be enforced by the state 
authorities 14 • It is submitted that it is not enough for the Legislature 
to declare that it recognises and guarantees human rights. The 
Legislature also has an obligation to allow the courts to address 
violations to human rights and to give effect to and implement 
fundamental rights, albeit through judicial activism and creativity15 • It 
is submitted that such an approach is sensible and justified on the 
basis that the Constitution does not contain prov1s1ons expressly 
dealing with judicial remedies and therefore it is implied that the 
courts must be assertive in giving effect to the rights and freedoms 
contained in the Constitution. To delay the granting of constitutional 
relief based on judicial abstention from making secondary legislation, 
would be contrary to section 7(4) (a) of the Constitution which provides 
that any person whose rights are violated shall have an effective 
remedy. It is submitted that assertive and self-executing action by the 
judiciary may be inevitable in order to uphold the fundamental rights 
contained in the Constitution .• The fact that South Africa possesses a 
developed and independent16 judiciary means that it can provide such 
remedies effectively and execute them convincingly. 
14 
15 
16 
Henkin L. The International Bill of Rights 1981. 311 
Ibid at 312. 
i 
see the views of cowling MG in Judges and the Protection of Hu~an 
Rights in South Africa : Articulating the Inarticulat;p Premlse 
( 1987) SAJHR 177 for a critique of the impartiality of the 
judiciary in Southern Africa. 
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JUDICIAL ACTIVISM UNDER A PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION 
In the interpretation of a bill of fundamental rights the particular judge 
has a relatively wide discretion to incorporate comparable foreign case 
law and international law into the interpretive process. This is a 
particularly portent aspect when one considers that some of the 
provisions of the Constitution are couched in very general language, 
thus leaving it to the courts to give these provisions content and 
meaning througb interpretation. The judiciary however must guard 
against interpretation which goes beyond the four corners of the 
Constitution. To alleviate the initial uncertainty surrounding the extent 
to which creative interpretation is sanctioned, the Legislature provided 
the judiciary with specific interpretive guidelines. Section 232(4) of the 
Constitution was enacted for this purpose and provides that : 
'In interpreting this Constitution a provision in any Schedule, including the 
provision under the l1eading National Unity and Reconciliation, to this Constitution 
shall not by reason only of the fact that it is contained in a Schedule, have 
a lesser status than any other provision of this Constitution which is not 
contained in a Schedule, and such provision shall for all purposes be deemed 
to form part of the substance of this Constitution.' 
The rationale behind inter alia section 232(4) and the preamble of 
the Constitution which provides that the purpose of the Constitution 
is to create a new order, is to keep open the door for improvement 
of the rights and freedoms contained in Chapter 3 of the Constitution 
on the one hand, and their enforcement on the other. The drafters of 
the Constitution anticipated the need to allow for a judicial discretion 
in defining the exact reach and application of the constitutionally 
protected rights and freedoms in that the entrenched provisions of the 
Constitution cannot easily be amended. Any judicial discretion under 
the Constitution brings about the concomitant possibility for judicial 
creativity, which should be seen as a positive aspect of the 
Constitution. The purposive approach constrained by section 35 of the 
Constitution however, defines judicial creativity by requmng the 
interpreter to look at the object of the statute in order to arrive at 
the true meaning of the words used in the text. 
The nature of the process clearly demonstrates that the judicial 
involvement is not mechanical and section 35(1) of the Constitution 
impels a broad, liberal and purposive method of interpretation which 
promotes the values underlying an open and democratic society based 
on freedom and equality. This section essentially incorporates the 
purposive approach to statutory interpretation into the Constitution. The 
purposive approach is intended to serve as a tool to overcome 
deficiencies in the wording of the Constitution, abridge changing 
circumstances, and in particular, to carry out the original intent and 
legislative purposes of the drafters17 • Thus for example the right of 
the individual to have his or her individual freedom protected was 
17 De Klerk v DU Plessis 1995 (2) SA 40 (T). 
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unmitigatedly violated in the name of 'apartheid ' 18 and as such the 
judiciary should all the more jealously guard the right to personal 
freedom on the basis that it is now recognised as a fundamental 
right. The contextual circumstances surrounding the right to personal 
freedom as evidenced by the numerous decisions in our case law 
dealing with the violation of the individual's liberty19, clearly indicate 
that the judiciary cannot be spectators of the abuse of the individual's 
liberty under a bill of rights. Friedman J in Nyamakazi v President of 
Bophuthatswana 2': adopted a purposive approach and held that : 
'A purposive construction of a bill of rigl1ts is necessary in that it enables the 
Court to take into account factors other than mere legal rules. These are the 
objectives of the rig/Jts contained therein, the circumstances operating at the time 
wl1en the interpretation has to be determined, the future implications of the 
construction, the impact of the said construction on future generations, the 
taking into account of new developments and changes in society. '21 
In Government of the Republic of Namibia v Cultura _?_()OQ_~2 , 
Mahomed CJ affirmed that constitutions must be broadly, liberally and 
purposively interpreted so as to avoid the 'austerity of tabulated 
legalism' and so as to enable it to continue to play a creative a-nd 
dynamic role in the expression and the achievement of the ideals and 
aspirations of the nation. Chapters or Charters of fundamental rights 
are invariably couched in broad terms so that the textual meaning can 
be read contextually years after their inception. It is therefore 
fundamental that the judiciary take cognizance of their interpretive 
function and discretion under the Constitution to develop a human 
rights culture which is both elastic and general enough to allow for 
subsequent contextual configuration. A narrow purposive approach 
would require the interpreter to only state what the objective of the 
particular right is and not to ascribe to the particular right a meaning 
and reach which goes beyond the literal wording of the text. It is 
submitted however that the purposive approach in its narrow sense, 
does not go far enough in allowing for the necessary judicial discretion 
to take into account the contextual circumstances and factors 
surrounding the right in question as well as the Constitution as a 
whole. The Constitution cannot be read clause by clause nor can any 
clause be interpreted without an understanding of the framework of 
the instrument23 • 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
staatspresident v United Democratic Front 1988 (4) SA 830 (A). 
See for example Minister of the Interior v Lockhat 1961 (2) SA 
587 (A) and Goldberg v Minister of Prisons 1979 (1) SA 14 (A). 
1992(4) SA 540 (BGD). 
at 567H. 
1994(1) SA 407 at 418 F. 
Davis D Democracy - It's Influence upon the Process of 
Constitutional Interpretation 1994 SAJHR 112. 
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In the case of Oozeleni v Minister of Law and Orde?-4 Froneman 
J held that it serves little purpose to characterise the proper approach 
to constitutional interpretation as liberal, generous or purposive since 
these labels do not in themselves assist in the interpretation process 
and carry the danger of introducing concepts or notions associated 
with them which may not find expression in the Constitution itself. 
According to Froneman J it is far more useful to recognise that, 
because the Constitution is the supreme law of the land against which 
all law or condl!lct is to be tested, it must be examined with a view 
to extracting from it those principles or values against which such law 
or conduct can be measured25 • Froneman J pointed out that : 
' ... the fundamental concern and scheme of the Constitution is to form a bridge 
between an unjust and undemocratic system of the past and a future system 
concerned with, inter alia, openness, democratic principles and human rights. '26 
The interpretation of a Bill of Rights is a creative process whereby 
the often general constitutional provisions are applied to specific factual 
situations by taking into account the social conditions, experiences and 
perceptions of the people of the country27 • Although the subjective 
opinion of the judicial officer regarding the meaning of the Constitution 
is irrelevant, the purposive approach should be utilised in its wide 
sense to glean the - true meaning of the written text tram the 
'unwritten' text. It requires taking into account the objects or- the 
framers of the Constitution, the purposes for which the Constitution 
and its guarantees were enacted, the spirit, purport and objects of the 
Chapter of Fundamental Rights as a whole, the contextual 
circumstances relative to the enactment of the particular rights, the 
demands of public international law and the future implications of the 
interpretation. 
It is clear from a reading of section 35(3) of the Constitution that 
the intention of Parliament is not confined to the words of the 
document but reaches wider to embrace the 'spirit, purport and 
objects' of the Bill of Rights. The Courts have a duty in terms of 
section 35(3) of the Constitution to have due regard to the spirit, 
purport and objects of Chapter 3. This means that the Courts have 
to develop and where necessary amend, the law in such a manner as 
to ensure that the law is in keeping with the Constitution on the 
basis that section 35(3) provides that 'any law ' is subject to the 
Constitution. This means inter alia that the Constitution must be 
interpreted so as to uphold the society the Bill of Rights seeks to 
24 
25 
26 
27 
19 9 4 ( 3 ) SA 6 2 5 ( E ) • 
at 633G. 
at 567 H. 
Ex parte Attorney-General, Namibia : in re corporal Punishment by 
organs of state 1991 (3) SA 76 (NmSC) at 96B-c. 
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achieve28 and effect must be given to the intention of its framers, 
the principles of government contained therein and the objectives and 
reasons for its legislation29 • Regard must be had to the contemporary 
norms, aspirations, expectations and sensitivities of the society as well 
as the emerging consensus of values in a civilised international 
community30 • Seen in this light the Constitution is a living document 
which can be adapted to comply with the needs of the time. In the 
words of Chief Justice Marshall of the United States Supreme Court 
'We must never forget tl1at it is a constitution we are expounding .... intended 
to endure for ages to come, and consequently to be adapted to tl1e various 
crises of 11uman affairs'. 31 
Likewise the interpretation of the Constitution cannot remain 
unaffected by the subsequent development of law. The Constitution 
has to be interpreted and applied within the framework of the entire 
legal system prevailing at the time of interpretation32 • In the case of 
0' Callaghan NO v Chaplin33 Innes CJ pointed out that the court must 
always adopt a contextually correct approach to interpretation. The 
learned Chief Justice noted that : 
'It is tl1e duty of a court .. .. tl1at it sl1all adapt itself to tl1e cl1anging conditions 
of tl1e time '. 
Interpretation is not only affected by social context but also by the 
generality of the language used in the Constitution. Chief Justice 
Rehnquist of the United States Supreme Court pointed out that : 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
'Wl1ere t11e framers .... used general language, tl1ey gave latitude to tl1ose wl1o 
would later interpret tl1e instrument to make tl1at language applicable to cases 
tl1at t/1e framers migl1t not l1ave foreseen. '34 
Smith v Attorney-General, Bophuthatswana 1984(1) SA 196 (B) at 
199 H. 
Nyamakazi v President of Bophuthatswana 1992(4) SA 540 (BGD). 
Ex Parte Attorney-General, Namibia : In Re corporal Punishment by 
organs of state 1991 (3) SA 76 (NmSC). 
M'Culloch v Maryland (1819) 17 us (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 at 415. 
cited by Friedman J in Nyamakazi (supra) at 549H. 
Meron T Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms as customary Law 
1989. 112 ; see also the advisory opinion by the International 
court of Justice in Legal consequences for states of the 
continued Presence of south Africa in Namibia 276 (1970), 1971 
ICJ Rep. 16 at 31. 
1927 A.O. at 310 and 327. 
William Rehnquist The Notion of a Living constitution 1976 
Texas 1 R 693, 4. 
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The initial interpretation of the Constitution is therefore of crucial 
importance. It is during this period that a human rights culture is 
established and the limitations on judicial involvement are set35• 
Without a liberal, creative and judicially activist interpretation of the 
Constitution providing effective remedies against human rights abuses, 
the Bill of Rights will amount to nothing more than a meaningless 
document. Judicial activism however, raises the problem of the 
legitimacy of judge-made law which goes beyond the four corners of 
the written Constitution. However the Constitution itself authorises a 
broad liberal approach and there is an essential difference between 
constitutionally sanctioned judicial activism and judicial law-making. The 
Chapter on Fundamental Rights is designated by the Constitution as 
a declaration of special importance36 and by implication the 
fundamental rights of the individual have to be protected by the 
Courts in the face of infringing legislation. The purpose of a Bill of 
Rights is to regulate the relationship between the state and the 
individual and to ensure that governmental violations of the rights of 
the individual do not go unanswered. It is submitted that even 
constitutional provisions which constrain the Court's power to protect 
the civil liberties of the individual cannot be blindly followed and left 
unscathed. The Court as custodian of individual liberty has to uphold 
the fundamental rights of the individual 'without fear, favour or 
prejudice'37, even if it means finding ways and means to overcome 
deficiencies in the Constitution. 
JUDICIAL REVIEW UNDER A BILL OF RIGHTS 
The Constitution incorporates an entrenched and justiciable Bill of Rights 
containing fundamental legal principles which set the norm for a 
constitutional state38 • This is an abjectly different regime to the 
1983 Constitution Act which essentially adhered to the principle of 
parliamentary sovereignty. One of the most significant changes is the 
testing power of the Constitutional Court39 to set aside legislation of 
the democratically elected Parliament which conflict with the 
fundamental rights guaranteed in the Constitution. Under a 
constitutional system based on parliamentary sovereignty the court must 
start from the premise of seeking 'the intention of the Legislature' 
because the interpreting judge's value judgement of the content of tfie 
statute is irrelevant. In a system of judicial review based on the 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
smith v Attorney-General, Bophuthatswana 1984 (1) SA 196 (B). 
Sections 7 and 229 of the Constitution. 
The judicial oath taken by judges of the supreme Court. 
Referred to in German constitutional law as "Rechtstaat". 
sections 9 8 ( 2 ) ( c) , 9 8 ( 3 ) , 101 ( 3 ) ( c) and 101 ( 6 ) of the 
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supremacy of the constitution on the other hand, the court has to 
test legislation and administrative action against the values and 
principles imposed by the Constitution 40 • Constitutional interpretation 
under a bill of rights necessitates that the courts engage in value 
judgements by having regard 'to the emerging consensus of values in 
a civilised international community 141 • 
The South African judiciary however is not unfamiliar with the 
concept of the • weighing up of values as evident even from the 
writings of the early Roman-Dutch legal scholars such as Voet whose 
perception of the weighing up of values in interpreting the law is 
formulated as follows : 
'that which is done contrary to law is not ipso iure null and void, where the 
law is content with a penalty laid down against those who contravene it in 
these and the like cases greater inconveniences and greater impropriety would 
follow on the actual rescission of the things done, than would attend the actual 
thing done contrary to the law '. 42 
The influence the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty and legal 
positivism had on the judiciary is not always easy to discern since the 
creative reticence of the judges are disguised through technical and 
sophisticated legal reasoning43 • The judiciary came short in 
ameliorating the unjust situations created by the state's onslaught on 
human rights through security legislation during the apartheid years. 
The reason for this is succinctly set out in the case of In re 
Mzolo44 in which it was pointed out that : 
'a court of law is not at liberty to arbitrarily ameliorate what it considers 
harshness in a statute. It is only where the statute is reasonably capable of 
more than one meaning that a court will give it the meaning which least 
interferes with the liberty of the individual '. 
The extent to which the judiciary was amenable to interference with 
the legislative enactments of parliament depended on the extent to 
which they regarded judicial review to be justified in terms of legal 
rules and legal reasoning45 • The judiciary preferred to give effect to 
legislative policies rather than oppose them in the name of human 
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rights by using the presumptions of interpretation which favoured 
individual liberty46 • The judiciary opted for a policy of judicial restraint 
and abstention from review and tacitly approved governmental action 
which arbitrarily distinguished between racially defined categories and 
treated them differently, notwithstanding the flagrant violations of the 
rules of natural justice and international human rights. Prior to the 
enactment of the South African Bill of Rights the judiciary only 
protected the civil liberties of the individual if able to rely on a 
specific rule, .. principle or presumption. The presumptions of 
interpretation functioned as a common law bill of rights in that they 
reflect the jurisprudence of natural law47 • But these presumptions 
which as a whole favour individual liberty were frequently sacrificed 
in the name of parliamentary sovereignty. The civil liberties of the 
individual are sacrosanct even in times of war and during states of 
emergency48 in that individual liberty is an absolute value which must 
be protected within any context49 • Innes JA in Whittaker v Governor 
of Johannesburg Gaof'0 pointed out that 'however reprehensible a man's 
views may be he is entitled to have his personal liberty protected '. 
The power of the Constitutional Court to declare null and void 
legislative enactments which conflict with the rights entrenched in 
Chapter 3 does not open the flood gates to the judicial review of 
Parliamentary legislation. The Constitution expressly provides for the 
curtailment of excessive judicial activism and section 98(2)(f) of the 
Constitution provides that the Constitutional Court itself determines 
whether any matter falls within its jurisdiction. In this regard section 
35(2) of the Constitution provides 
'No law which limits any of the rights entrenched in {Chapter 3/ shall be 
constitutionally invalid solely by reason of the fact that the wording used prima 
facie exceeds the limits imposed in {Chapter 3/, provided such a law is 
reasonably capable of a more restricted interpretation which does not exceed 
such limits, in w/Jich event such law shall be construed as having a meaning in 
accordance with the more restricted interpretation'. 
This section encapsulates the presumption of constitutionality which 
is found in the Latin maxim ut res magis valeat quam pereat. The 
same presumption is reiterated in section 232(3) of the Constitution 
under the heading 'Interpretation'. The rationale behind the presumption 
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of constitutionality is to delineate judicial activism and prevent the 
judiciary from becoming a super-legislature substituting its yle~!_l_9r 
that of the [egislature. The presumption of constitutionality has another 
impo-rfant function namely to set parameters for judicial non-
intervention51 in the political arena. The result of too liberal 
constitutional interpretation is that excessive judicial activism in relation 
to a Bill of Rights results in the Court engaging in not only value 
judgments, but also in policy decisions which strictly speaking fall 
within the provirce of the Legislature. Furthermore the invalidation of 
legislation has the result that a lacuna is left in the country's 
legislation52. For this reason Hiemstra CJ in S v Marwane53 held 
that a Bill of Rights is not a wide-open door to the invalidation of 
legislation54. Legislative provisions which restrict fundamental rights are 
to be narrowly and strictly construed by the court as guardian of 
liberty, but it has to exercise its powers of controlling legislation with 
a scalpel and not a sledgehammer55 . 
Judicial review under a Bill of Rights is a significant departure from 
the formalistic attitude of analytical, positivistic jurisprudence associated 
with the concept of parliamentary sovereignty which dominated South 
African juridical thinking for decades. The Constitution is a living 
system of values and societal aspirations, and it is up to the courts 
to give meaning and effect to this system of values underpinning the 
Constitution. Section 35 of the Constitution impels a purposive 
approach of interpretation as well as the application of public 
international law and comparable foreign case law. Section 35(3) 
unequivocally implores the judiciary to not only purposively interpret the 
Constitution but also to take a creative role in ensuring that in the 
interpretation of all law, due regard is paid to the 'spirit, purport and 
object' of the Bill of Rights. TJle extent to which it is permissible to 
employ judicial activism when in-terprefing- the Bill of -Rights should be 
defined in order to erase any doubts regarding the legitimacy--ora 
-judicially created unwritten constitutional text which contains the 
system of values called into being by the Constitution. If the 
Constitution is to be more than just a written manifesto, the spirit as 
opposed to the letter of the Constitution should be upheld by the 
judiciary, and the ability of the judiciary to vindicate the fundamental 
rights of citizens should not be limited by the Constitution or any 
other law. In this regard Kruger points out that : 
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'Deur aldus aktivisties te werk te gaan, aktiveer die regspreker as't ware regswaardes 
wat nie uitdruklik in die prim~re teks neergel~ is nie, maar wat tog 'n geimpliseerde dee/ 
van die teks uitmaak. ' 56 
Invariably the Constitution will prove to be in need of concise 
interpretation and wanting for the exposition of an 'unwritten text' 
where the factual circumstances are not provided for in the 
Constitution. The judiciary cannot respond in positivist fashion and 
assert that the Constitution is silent on that aspect and that the court 
cannot consider ·the matter. The reason is that having regard to the 
'spirit, purport and object' of the Constitution, the judges should in 
effect apply the Constitution as if a document embodying the written 
and the unwritten text. 
THE SUPREME COURT AND FUNCTIONAL CREATIVITY 
The Supreme Court has been confronted on more than one 
occasion57 with the question as to whether or not it had the power 
to grant interim relief based on alleged violations of constitutionally 
guaranteed rights. In the cases of Bux v Officer Commanding, 
Pietermaritzburg Prison56 and Matiso v Commanding Officer, Port 
Elizabeth Prison59 the legal question for consideration was whether 
the Court had the jurisdiction to grant an interdict based on the 
alleged unconstitutionality of section 65F( 1) read with section 65H of 
the Magistrates' Courts Act 32 of 1944, pending a decision by the 
Constitutional Court. Section 65F( 1) of the Magistrates' Court Act 
provides that a warrant of arrest may be issued in the absence of the 
judgment debtor. This procedure is in direct conflict with sections 
24(b) 60 and 25(3) 61 of the Constitution. In both Bux and Matiso the 
applicants were arrested and imprisoned by way of the section 65F( 1) 
procedure under the Magistrates' Court Act and the applicants 
respectively applied for a mandatory interdict ordering their release from 
detention. 
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In both Bux and Matiso a purposive approach was followed but the 
judges arrived at different interpretations. The difference in 
interpretation between the two cases is explained by the fact that a 
purposive interpretation is predicated upon the purpose of the right and 
consequently the widest possible interpretation will not inevitably be 
the one which will be supported62 • In Bux Didcott J interpreted the 
Constitution purposively and held that the Court had no jurisdiction to 
grant interim relief in that the wording of the Constitution does not 
permit the SuQreme Court to attribute to itself a constitutional 
jurisdiction wider than that encompassed by the wording of the 
Constitution. Didcott J reasoned that the court in shaping the Bill of 
Rights has to first and foremost pay deference to the written 
document. Didcott J found that the court's powers of review were 
limited by sections 98(2)(c), 98(3) and 101 (6) of the Constitution 
which when read together, confer on the Constitutional Court an 
exclusive jurisdiction in respect of any enquiry into the constitutionality 
of an Act of Parliament and forbid the Supreme Court to trespass on 
that field unless the parties to the litigation agree to its doing so63 • 
Consequently Didcott J declined to have recourse to remedies which 
were alien to the literal wording of the document. The judicial deferent 
approach of Didcott J is in line with the cautionary note sounded by 
Hiemstra CJ in Smith v Attorney-General, Bophuthatswana64 with 
regard to over-activism as opposed to 'deference to the legislature '. 
Hiemstra CJ pointed out that the court's over-activism in striking down 
legislation may, apart from incurring the resentment of the Legislature, 
cause the Bill of Rights to become 'a clog upon the wheels of 
government 165 • The jurisprudential implications and soundness of such 
a judicial deferent approach under a bill of rights have been questioned 
by the courts and legal scholars66 • 
In sharp contrast Froneman J in Matiso held that the interpretation 
of the Constitution must be directed at ascertaining the -foundational 
values inherent in the Constitution. In this sense constitutional 
interpretation is thus primarily concerned with the recognition and 
application of constitutional values and not with a search to find the 
literal meaning of the Constitution. Froneman J noted that the 
Constitution gives explicit recognition to the role of the judiciary and 
in terms of the Constitution the courts bear the responsibility of giving 
specific content to those values and principles underlying the 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
Cachalia et al Fundamental Rights in the New Constitution 1994. 
11 
at 564!. 
1984(1) SA 196 (B). 
at 199B-C. 
Monnakale v Republic of Bophuthatswana 1991(1) SA 598 (B) at 620B 
; Du Plessis & Du Ville Bill of Rights Interpretatio.R in the 
south African context (l) : Diagnostic observations (1993) 
Stellenbosch Law Review 74. 
17 
Constitution. Froneman J argued that such an approach is consonant 
with 'values which underlie an open and democratic society based on 
freedom and equality' in that the Constitution forms a bridge between 
an unjust and undemocratic system of the past and a future system 
concerned with openness, democratic principles and human rights67 • 
Relying on this view Froneman J granted the interim relief sought by 
the applicant. The views of Froneman J are liberal and a drastic 
departure from the traditional South African principles of interpretation. 
Not surprisingly .the Constitutional Court in its first judgement namely 
the case of Zuma and Others v The State68 made reference to the 
liberal views of Froneman J. In Zuma Kentridge AJ expressed the 
following caution to such a liberal approach : 
---"'-- ·--·-··-"----·. -----·-
'I am, however sure that Froneman J, in his reference to the fundamental "mischief" to 
be remedied, did not intend to say that all the principles of law which have hitherto 
governed our courts are to be ignored. Those principles obviously contain much of lasting 
value. Nor, I am equally sure, did the learned Judge intend to suggest that we slwuld 
neglect the language of the Constitution. While we must always be conscious of the 
values underlying the Constitution, it is nonetheless our task to interpret a written 
instrument. I am well aware of the fallacy of supposing that general language must have 
a single "objective" meaning. Nor is it easy to avoid the influence of one's personal 
intellectual and moral preconceptions. But it cannot be too strongly stressed that the 
Constitution does not mean whatever we mig/Jt wish it to mean . .ea 
The concerns of Kentridge AJ are valid but such a qualified 
contextual approach lends itself to unthinking compliance with the 
written text. Although the constitutional text is the starting point of 
any interpretation, a Constitution must be treated as a sui generis 
instrument with principles of interpretation of its own, suitable to its 
character, without necessary acceptance of all the presumptions that 
are relevant to legislation of private law70 • The Constitution is also 
an enduring and evolving statement of general values and as such 
those who wish to treat the constitutional text as immutable do so 
at their own peril in that they repudiate any concern for possible 
drafting oversights and changing circumstances71 • 
The approach of Froneman J is jurisprudentially sound in that the 
learned judge looked at the Constitution as a whole, including the 
literal meaning, the surrounding circumstances, historical background and 
legislative purposes. This is essentially a manifestation of an unqualified 
contextual methodology which is of great value when a Constitution 
is interpreted years after its inception when the norms and aspirations 
67 
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of society have changed. Consonant with such an approach is the 
creative element of ensuring that the constitutionally guaranteed rights 
of the individual are afforded a contemporary as well as a value-
coherent exposition. As such the court should not be inhibited by 
jurisdictional constraints when the fundamental rights of individuals are 
at stake, but should rather extend their constitutional jurisdiction to 
grant relief consonant with the general values inherent in the 
Constitution. This is in fact the method of interpretation designated by 
the Constitution .in its interpretation clause. Even the Appellate Division 
recognises that a strict construction must be placed on provisions 
which clog the right to seek judicial reliet72 • In the Supreme Court 
the judiciary is faced with applicants who are real people seeking 
protection of their constitutionally guaranteed rights. The protection of 
the individual's fundamental rights should not simply be an abstract 
concept. It should be enforced on a practical level as concrete justice. 
In this regard Steyn J in S v A 73 points out that : 
'Terwyl ek geensins wil voorgee dat daar nie gevalle is wat gepas is om by wyse van 'n 
versoek om regsverklaring van soortgelyke aard as die huidige by die Hof aanhandig te 
maak nie, wil ek tog bedenkinge uitspreek aangaande die ontwikkeling van 'n tendens 
dat, veral strafsake maar ook ander, vertraag word bloat deur akademiese konstitutionele 
geskilpunte te opper. Akademiese debatte hoort tuis in die akademie, nie in die Hof nie. 
Dit is veral die geval waar sodanige aansprake geopper word sonder dat hulle op 
gegronde feitebevindings berus en dikwels die gevolg sou meebring dat verdere en 
moontlike onnodige vertragings bevorder word. "Justice delayed is justice denied" is geen 
ydele slagspreuk nie. a 4 
The decision in Matiso and the views of Steyn J are in keeping 
with section 7(4) (a) of the Constitution which provides that when an 
infringement of or threat to any right entrenched in Chapter 3 is 
alleged, any person with locus standi shall be entitled to apply to a 
'competent court' of law for 'appropriate relief'. A 'competent court' 
would be a court having jurisdiction to hear and decide the matter as 
provided for in the Constitution or any other statute. 'Appropriate relier 
means relief consonant with the 'interests of justice'. In Matiso 
Froneman J relied on section 102( 1) of the Constitution to found 
jurisdiction namely the phrase 'the provincial or local division concerned 
shall, if it considers it to be in the interest of justice to do so, refer 
such matter to the Constitutional Court' (my emphasis). In the opinion 
of Froneman J it would not have been 'in the interests of justice' to 
deny the applicant 'appropriate relier where a clear violation of a 
fundamental right was present, notwithstanding the court's lack of 
jurisdiction upon a literal reading of the Constitution. Froneman J 
reasoned that the Supreme Court possesses an inherent jurisdiction· 
independent from that accorded by statute to remedy wrongs 
72 Du Toit v Ackerman 1962 (2) SA 581 (A) at 588. 
1995(2) BCLR 153 (C). 
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committed against individuals75 • This is a significant break with the 
traditional position first laid down by the Appellate Division in Sefatsa 
v Attorney-General, Transvaa/76 that parliament has the power to oust 
the jurisdiction of the courts and therefore the courts do not possess 
an inherent jurisdiction independent from statute77 • 
The judicial activism displayed by Froneman J is to be welcomed and 
accepted as forming part of a new and unique Southern African 
constitutional jurjsprudence. The assumption by the Supreme Court of 
a jurisdiction impinging upon the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court 
to declare null and void legislative enactments in conflict with the Bill 
of Rights is not advocated. Such an approach will have the 
unsatisfactory result that different divisions of the Supreme Court may 
deliver conflicting judgements as to the invalidity of the challenged 
legislation and cause unprecedented uncertainty. The Matiso judgment 
however illustrates how the judiciary can protect the fundamental rights 
of the 'individual by using an unqualified contextual approach and 
purposive interpretation which have the collective result that the 
Constitution is interpreted as a collective whole, including the taking 
into account of factors not specifically mentioned in the constitutional 
text but which nevertheless form part of it. Although the Constitutional 
Court cautioned that the written text of the Constitution cannot be 
ignored and that traditional principles are still of 'lasting value', the 
fact cannot be overlooked that the original intent of the framers of 
the South African Constitution was to form a new judicial and 
constitutional dispensation. It was this intention that was used by 
Froneman J to justify the assumption of an extended constitutional 
jurisdiction to get around the jurisdictional constraints imposed upon 
him by the Constitution and arrive at an interpretation which is 
consonant with the 'spirit, purport and objects' of the Bill of Rights. 
If Froneman J followed the narrow purposive approach adopted by 
Didcott J in Bux, without taking into account all the contextual 
factors, then he would have merely paid lip service to the wording of 
the Constitution and failed in protecting the fundamental rights of the 
individual which is in fact the rationale behind the implementation of 
the South African Bill of Rights. The judicially assertive approach of 
Froneman J proved to be in line with the legislative intention. 
Subsequent to Matiso's case the legislator removed the judicial 
uncertainty surrounding the Supreme Court's power to grant an 
interdict pending the decision by the Constitutional Court by enacting 
section 16 of the Constitutional Court Complementary Act 13 of 1995 
which now provides that : 
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'Any division of tl1e Supreme Court sl1al/ l1ave jurisdiction to grant an interim interdict or 
similar relief, pending tl1e determination by the Court of any matter referred to in section 
98(2) of the Constitution, notwithstanding the fact that such interdict or relief might have 
the effect of suspending or otherwise interfering with the application of the provisions 
of an Act of Parliament.' 
The reference to 'similar relief ' is a profound indication that the 
Legislature recognises that the judicial discretion under the Bill of 
Rights involves the rectification of what Froneman J calls a legislative 
'mischief'. What makes Froneman J's approach noteworthy is the fact 
that he had a limited judicial framework within which to enforce the 
Bill of Rights and through his judicial activism transcended the confines 
of the jurisdictional constraints imposed upon him. This does not mean 
that judges can invent a system of values and read these into the 
Constitution under the guise of interpretation. However the very nature 
of a Bill of Rights suggests that the protection of fundamental rights 
requires the judiciary to assume a non-mechanical interpretive function 
which unavoidably involves the exercise of judicial creativity. It is trite 
that constitutions are not value-free and in fact their fundamental 
purpose is to select and elevate specified rights and values over 
others 78 • 
The views of Froneman J are further supported by section 100(3) (f) 
of the Constitution which provides that the Supreme Court has 
jurisdiction in respect of the determination of questions whether any 
matter falls within its jurisdiction as well as section 19( 1) (a) (iii) of the 
Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959 which provides that : 
'A provincial or local division sl1al/ .... l1ave power in its discretion, and at the 
instance of any interested person, to enquire into and determine any existing, 
future or contingent right or obligation, notwithstanding that such person cannot 
claim any relief consequential upon the determination'. 
Although this section of the Supreme Court Act supports the view 
taken by Froneman J in Matiso that the court could enquire into the 
validity of an Act notwithstanding the fact that the Court is 
jurisdictionally constrained by the Constitution to do so, the Court 
should nevertheless only pronounce on future rights if its decision 
would be binding on persons affected thereby79 • Based on this 
principle the court in Masaku v State President8° rejected the 
relevance of section 19( 1) (a) (iii) of the Supreme Court Act to the 
granting of interim relief under the Constitution. Section 16 of the 
Constitutional Court Complimentary Act altered this position in that the 
Supreme Court is now expressly authorised to grant interim interdicts 
pending a decision by the Constitutional Court and the court's decision 
78 
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would therefore be binding. However in the case of S v Mhlungu81 
Kentridge AJ formulated a general principle that : 
'where it is possible to decide any case, civil or criminal, without reaching a 
constitutional issue, that is the course which should be followed '.82 
This principle accords with the view of the United States Supreme 
Court that a question of constitutional law should never be anticipated 
in advance of tbe necessity of deciding it and a rule of constitutional 
law should never be formulated broader than is required by the precise 
facts to which it is to be applied83 • The Constitutional Court ruled 
in the Zantsi84 case that a local or provincial division of the Supreme 
Court had no jurisdiction to enquire into the constitutionality of an Act 
of Parliament passed by the South African Parliament, irrespective of 
whether such Act had been passed before or after the commencement 
of the Constitution. This does not mean however, that the Supreme 
Court in exercising its powers in terms of section 101 (2) of the 
Constitution which section clothes the Supreme Court with common 
law, inherent and constitutional jurisdiction, cannot act to protect the 
fundamental rights of citizens. As long as the Supreme Court does not 
purport to strike down an Act of Parliament or enquire into the 
constitutionality of an Act of Parliament, it always has the power, 
albeit subject to the Constitution, to address violations or threatened 
violations of fundamental rights entrenched in Chapter 385 • 
The court in the case of Mangano v District Magistrate, 
Johannesburg86 went one step further in recognising the extended 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under the Constitution by holding 
that section 7(4)(a) of the Constitution did not provide that the right 
to interfere with an Act of Parliament which infringe upon a right 
entrenched in Chapter 3, was limited to the grounds of review 
enumerated in section 24 of the Supreme Court Act 59 of 195987 • 
In Ferreira v Levin88 a majority of two judges concurring, one 
dissenting also held that a provincial or local division of the Supreme 
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Court does have jurisdiction to grant interim interdicts preventing the 
exercise of rights or powers permitted by an Act of Parliament, 
pending a decision by the Constitutional Court as to whether the Act 
is unconstitutional or not89 • This approach is also in line with section 
22 of the Constitution which provides for the right to have access to 
courts. Consequent upon section 22 any prov1s1on ousting the 
jurisdiction of the courts will be constitutionally invalid in that the 
Constitution recognises that the courts under a system of judicial 
review enjoy a .. more comprehensive jurisdiction. 
Clearly the Supreme Court can, and must if necessary, utilise its 
powers of interdict to prevent violations or threatened violations of a 
persons's fundamental rights, more particularly since the Constitution 
specifically confirms the inherent jurisdiction vested in the Supreme 
Court90 • However section 229 of the Constitution which provides for 
continuity of legislation cannot be ignored. Section 229 provides 
that 
'Subject to tl1is Constitution, all laws wl1icl1 immediately before tl1e 
commencement of tl1is Constitution were in force in any area which forms part 
of tl1e national territory, shall continue in force in such area, subject to any 
repeal or amendment of such laws by a competent authority '. 
Based on the reasoning that the Supreme Court was not authorised 
to interfere with existing legislation, the Supreme Court on numerous 
occasions declined to grant interim interdicts based on the alleged 
violation of fundamental rights91 • It is submitted that the correct 
interpretation is to view the granting of interim relief by the Supreme 
Court prior to the Constitutional Court ruling on the constitutionality 
or otherwise of the Act in question, as not suspending or striking 
down the particular Act of Parliament. The Supreme Court in granting 
such interim interdicts is simply determining whether the alleged 
violation complained of, is consistent with the scheme of the 
Constitution and the Court in exercising its inherent jurisdiction to 
come to the protection of the applicant's fundamental rights determines 
whether or not the applicant has a right, whether prima facie or 
otherwise, which could be protected by an interdict. The Court, strictly 
speaking, is not striking down an Act of Parliament or declaring its 
existence as unconstitutional92 • The bold decision in Matiso must also 
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be viewed in context. At the time Matiso was decided, the 
Constitutional Court was not yet constituted and therefore clearly there 
was no competent authority to settle the alleged justiciable dispute, let 
alone a right to institute proceedings in such a non-existent Court93 • 
Prior to the sitting of the Constitutional Court therefore, there rested 
an additional duty on the Supreme Court to uphold the fundamental 
rights of citizens. In Oozeleni v Minister of Law and Order4 
Froneman J pointed out correctly95 that : 
.. 
'Tile role of Judges in a system of judicial review based on tl1e supremacy of 
tile Constitution is bound to be controversial in any event, but the judicial 
llistory of tllis country makes it even more likely if due regard is not given to 
possible deficiencies in the past. A special responsibility rests on Judges in this 
regard ... ' 
A constitution is defined as the framework which structures the 
assemblage of laws, institutions and customs which govern a nation 
and its peoples, an ideological manifesto and written manifestation of 
national purpose96 • As such the Constitution is a living document 
embodying the national soul and the framers of the Constitution made 
certain fundamental value choices manifested in the words of the 
document. The words of the written text may or may not give explicit 
content to the values underlying the Constitution and therefore the 
Courts have to ascertain and enforce the intended meaning of 
constitutional provisions. 
The Court gives meaning to the system of values and norms called 
into being by the Bill of Rights, having regard to textual and 
contextual factors97 • The narrow view of ·judicial activism holds that 
the judiciary is supposed to only proclaim what rights are and not 
what their substantial virtues are98 • However Mcintyre J (as he then 
was) in R v Andrews99 pointed out that 'realistic judges acknowledge 
their role as social engineers '. The line however, should be drawn 
where judges in considering 'adjudicative facts' interpret 'legislative 
facts' in such a way as to take on a political role as a super-
legislature that functions beyond the reach of Parliament. In Matiso 
93 
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Podlas v Cohen and Bryden NNO 1994(4) SA 662 (T) at 674A. 
1994(3) SA 625 (OK) at 633; also 1994(3) BCLR 75 (OK). 
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Roadie E Discrimination in the Constitutions of the World 
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Froneman J observed that judicial review under a bill of rights is still 
subject to important constraints and the recognition of those 
constraints is the best guarantee or shield against criticism that a 
system of judicial review is essentially undemocratic100 • A Bill of 
Rights has to be applied and interpreted as if an expression of the 
national soul. This does not mean that the Courts have the power to 
interpret the Constitution wider than the parameters set by the 
Constitution itself. But the Constitution compels the judiciary to take 
cognizance of the spirit and not only the letter of the Constitution and 
in so doing read into the text of the Constitution the inherent 
unwritten text. 
INTERPRETIVISM VERSUS NON-INTERPRETIVISM 
Those that support interpretivism maintain that interpretation is only 
legitimate if based on norms and values found in the language and 
structure of the Constitution. The supporters of non-interpretivism argue 
that it is legitimate to rely on values that are external to the 
document. The conflicting views that have emerged in Matiso and Bux 
regarding the interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution which 
confer on the Supreme Court the power to address violations of 
fundamental rights highlight the underlying interpretivist and non-
interpretivist debate. 
Didcott J in Bux followed what may be called an interpretivist 
approach and refused to adopt an interpretation which took account 
of extra-textual sources. The Constitution provides in section 102(1) 
that the judicial officer concerned must postpone the matter if 'in the 
interests of justice '. But justice is not served if the aggrieved party's 
fundamental rights cannot be enforced because the matter has to be 
postponed on the basis that fidelity has to be paid to the text of the 
Constitution. The 'spirit, purport and objects' of the Constitution are 
to be upheld and not only the wording of the document. This means 
that the judiciary has to enforce the Constitution with this purpose in 
mind and that the courts have a duty to protect the public against 
human rights violations. This is essentially what the Matiso judgement 
illustrates on a practical level. Froneman J indicated that he intends 
to uphold the values underlying the Constitution notwithstanding 
jurisdictional constraints. In so doing he illustrated the utter necessity 
in certain circumstances to look beyond the four corners of the 
Constitution for meaning. This incorporation of value-coherent meaning 
into the text is the hallmark of the non-interpretivist approach and is 
justified on the basis that the original intent and purpose of the rights 
and freedoms contained in the Constitution will not remain unaffected 
by changing circumstances. 
Although Matiso is not the modern-day equivalent of Marbury v 
JOO at 598C. 
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Madison 101 , it nevertheless sets a valuable precedent for the future 
in that the liberal and activist thinking of a judge sitting in a local 
division of the Supreme Court ensured that a citizen's constitutionally 
guaranteed rights were upheld in the face of a lack of jurisdiction. 
The judicial activism exerted in Matiso is an exemplary illustration of 
the protection of the civil liberties of the individual by extEfricffrig the 
meaning of the Constitution through judicial activism. In Marbury v 
Madison the United States Supreme Court declirled to accept the 
jurisdiction it was clothed with by statute on the ground that it was 
'repugnant to the Constitution M 2 and in so doing established its 
review power. The South African Constitution expressly provides for 
judicial review by laying down in section 4 of the Constitution that 
the Constitution is supreme. However the approach of Froneman J is 
nevertheless profound in that the court adopted an approach akin to 
that of the United States Supreme Court in Marbury v Madison. 
Froneman J reasoned that the spirit of the Constitution enjoins the 
court with a jurisdiction to address human rights violations and as 
such the court cannot turn a blind eye to infringing legislation on the 
basis that the wording of the Constitution does not give the court 
that power. The hallmark of the office of a present-day South African 
judge is that of custodian of human rights and liberties. This embraces 
the enforcement of the values underlying the Constitution rather than 
paying lip service to the language of the written text of the 
Constitution. Although the Courts are not to act as incontrovertible 
'engineers' in their interpretation of the Constitution, there is 
nevertheless a definite judicial discretion assigned to the Courts in 
section 35(1) of the Constitution to promote the values underlying an 
open and democratic society based on freedom and equality. The court 
would also be failing in its duty to be just and reasonable if it were 
to refuse mitigating the harsh effects of obscure or defective 
constitutional provisions103 • 
The scope for judicial activism is substantially lessened where the 
meaning of the rights and freedoms concerned is expressed in 
unequivocal terms. Mr Justice Black of the United States Supreme 
Court was an interpretivist and argued for absolute Human Rights 
where meaning is fixed and room for uncertainty is abolished. In the 
case of Goldberg v l<elly104 Black said the following regarding 
codified constitutions : 
101 
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'A written constitution, designed to guarantee protection against governmental 
abuses, including those of judges, must have written standards that mean 
something definite and have explicit content.' 
5 U.S. (1 cranch) 137 (1803). 
Ibid at 176. 
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In his work, A Constitutional Faith , Black wrote : 
'I simply believe that "Congress shall make no law• means Congress shall make 
no law. ' 105 
The concern that Black expressed when he spoke out in favour of 
a literal mode of interpretation was that an interpretation that was not 
grounded in the Constitution was illegitimate and constitutionally invalid. 
Black perceived .. the problem to be a follow on from the landmark 
decision in Marbury v Madison 106 holding that the courts were to 
be the final interpreters of the Constitution. He reasoned that the 
testing power of the court 'can provide an opportunity to slide 
imperceptibly into constitutional amendment and lawmaking'107 • Black 
was against the court exercising its interpretative function as a form 
of legislation 100 in that the Court effectively imposes its own ideas 
and values upon society when it goes beyond the express words of 
the Constitution and this exercise is essentially undemocratic. 
The South African judges also have among their numbers those who 
choose to rather err on the positivist side, than extend the meaning 
and scope of statutes. The argument raised is that the actual meaning 
of the words used by the Legislature sets the outer limit of admissible 
judicial interpretation. The classical formulation of this school of 
thought is the following : 
'The task of the Courts is to ascertain from the words of the statute in the 
context thereof what the intention of the Legislature is. If tl1e wording of t11e 
statute is clear and unambiguous they state what the intention is. It is not for 
tl1e Court to invent fancy ambiguities and usurp the function of the 
Legislature. ' 109 
The concern of the propounders of literalism is that the impartiality 
and repute of the judiciary will be brought into question should the 
judiciary descend into the political arena when making value judgments. 
But at the same time should it be accepted that the function of the 
judiciary under a bill of rights is bound to be somewhat controversial, 
especially in light of the fact that the judiciary did not previously 
enjoy a substantive testing right. It is an established principle of 
constitutional interpretation that constitutional provisions cannot be read 
105 
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107 
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in isolation 110 • The Constitution is more than just an expression of 
the wishes of the majority of the people, it is a written manifesto 
containing the civil liberties of the individual and is intended to endure 
for ages to come. In this regard section 35(3) of the Constitution 
impels the court to have regard to not merely the literal meaning of 
the text, but also to interpret the Constitution according to the spirit, 
purport and objects of Chapter 3. The so-called non-interpretive 
approach of Froneman J in Matiso, although activist and liberal, is still 
interpretive in a .plausible sense in that Froneman J disregarded neither 
the text of the Constitution nor the motives of those who made 
it111 • He rather sought to articulate the unwritten values found within 
the conceptual four corners of the Constitution. The decision in Matiso 
was rather a progressive decision about the protection of fundamental 
rights than a decision aiming at transgressing on the terrain exclusively 
reserved for the Legislature and Constitutional Court. The decision 
illustrates that in order to truly protect fundamental rights, the plain 
meaning of words may have to make way for value-coherent decisions 
which better serve democracy by respecting the principles endorsed by 
the Legislature. 
LIMITED JUSTICE 
The South African Constitution is based on an amalgamation of the 
best features of various constitutions112 • But even this document 
constituted from years of experience in other countries may prove and 
has already shown113 that omissions are always present due to the 
fallibility of human faculties. In the words of Thomas Jefferson : 
'The Declaration of Rights is like all other lwman blessings allowed with some 
inconveniences and not accomplishing fully its object. But the good in this 
instance vastly overweighs the evil .... '. 114 
In order for the Bill of Rights to be an effective weapon against 
governmental onslaughts making inroads into the individual's protected 
rights and freedoms, the courts have to respond in activist fashion to 
ensure compliance with fundamental rights and any citizen should be 
able to approach the courts for constitutional relief. In Qozeleni v 
llO 
Ill 
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Minister of Law and Order115 Froneman J pointed out that if the 
Constitution is to fulfil its stated purposes, it must not only be 
interpreted in such a manner as to give clear expression to the values 
it seeks to nurture for a future South Africa, but this should be done 
in a way which makes it a living document for all the citizens of the 
country and not only for the chosen few who deal with it in courts 
of law116 • The courts therefore have a duty under the Constitution 
to ensure that justice is seen to be done and not merely recognised 
on the paper th~ Constitution is written on. 
The notion of 'tabulated legalism '117 has become synonymous with 
the South African judiciary over the years. This view of the judiciary 
is further exacerbated by Rule 17 of the Constitutional Court which 
restricts direct access to the Constitutional Court. The effect of this 
rule is that the provincial or local division of the Supreme Court must 
be approached for relief before access to the Constitutional Court is 
granted. This position is untenable if the Supreme Court in question 
does not have the authority to remedy the human rights violation 
complained of118 • However where parties to civil or criminal 
proceedings agree in terms of section 101 (6) of the Constitution that 
the division of the Supreme Court in question shall have jurisdiction 
to decide whether an Act of Parliament is constitutionally valid, the 
Court will then by virtue of the consent to jurisdiction have the 
authority to determine the issue as if the Court had the same 
jurisdiction as that exclusively granted to the Constitutional Court119• 
The Court in those circumstances will in effect be obliged to 
pronounce upon the validity of the Act and cannot refer the matter 
to the Constitutional Court on the basis that the matter is decisive of 
the case and falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Constitutional 
Court120• In sharp contrast to the theoretical justice afforded by 
South African constitutional remedies as outlined above, the Indian 
legal system provides accessible procedures to engage the help of the 
courts in remedying human rights violations. Indian public interest 
litigation is simplified by the appointment of fact finding commissions 
which remove the evidentiary burden from litigants 121 • In India any 
communication to any particular judge in the form of a letter or 
115 
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telegram is enough to initiate a constitutional action and could be 
converted into a writ petition without any verification122 • In Mukesh 
Advani v State of Madhya Pradesh 123 the Court accepted a clipping 
of a newspaper article on the sordid state of bonded labourers 
working in stone quarries in Madhya Pradesh, as the basis for a 
petition. Although the Madhya judgment is extremely casual and lends 
itself to violations of the rules of natural justice and the audi alteram 
partem rule in particular, it nevertheless illustrates a sense of justice 
for all not practised in South Africa. 
The scope for the protection of fundamental rights in the Magistrates' 
Courts is substantially lessened by the Constitution. Section 103(1) of 
the Constitution provides that the 'establishment, jurisdiction, 
composition and functioning of all other courts shall be as prescribed 
by or under a law'. This means that the ordinary jurisdiction of the 
magistrates' courts is retained, but the magistrates' courts now also 
have to apply the provisions of the Constitution save in those 
instances where they are expressly precluded from so doing. Section 
98(3) of the Constitution provides that : 
'The Constitutional Court shall be the only court having jurisdiction over a matter 
referred to in subsection (2), save where otherwise provided in sections 101 (3) 
and (6) and 103( 1 J and in an Act of Parliament'. 
The phrase 'an Act of Parliament' means any statute in existence 
immediately before or after the commencement of the Constitution. The 
Magistrates' Court Act 32 of 1944 falls within the definition of 'Act 
of Parliament' and therefore if in a Magistrates' Court dispute between 
the State and a citizen or between two private individuals, there arose 
as a matter of course, a constitutional question or issue incidental to 
the jurisdiction124 of the Magistrates' Courts, then the Magistrates' 
Court concerned has jurisdiction to entertain constitutional argument by 
the litigants to the dispute and make a finding of law regarding the 
applicability of the Constitution. 
The Magistrates' Courts can however, not pronounce upon the validity 
of Acts of Parliament or grant interim relief based on alleged violations 
of fundamental rights. These aspects fall within the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court and Supreme Court 
respectively125 and the Magistrates' Court concerned must decide the 
matter as if the law is valid or postpone the proceedings in the 
interests of justice so as to enable a party to apply to a competent 
122 
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court126 for relief. In Qozeleni v Minister of Law and Order127 
Froneman J held that although the magistrates' courts are clearly 
excluded from an extended jurisdiction pertaining to judicial review, but 
it does not follow that in exercising their normal jurisdiction 
magistrates' courts are otherwise precluded from applying the full law 
of the land and that they are restricted to applying law of a crippled 
nature, namely law divorced from the inherent norms and values of 
the Constitution 128 • However, section 103(3) and (4) of the 
Constitution prQvide for a special procedure to challenge the 
constitutional validity of legislative enactments prior to finalisation of 
the matter in the magistrate's court. Froneman J also pointed out that 
it would be absurd not to apply those constitutional provisions which 
are meant to safeguard the fundamental rights of citizens in the courts 
where the majority of people would have their initial and perhaps only 
contact with the provisions of the Constitution. Such an interpretation 
he went on to hold, would frustrate the very purpose of the 
Constitution of constituting a bridge to a better future129 • 
Granting the Constitutional Court exclusive jurisdiction to set aside 
legislation in conflict with the Chapter on fundamental rights brings 
about the unsatisfactory position that applicants in the Supreme Court 
cannot always obtain relief sought under the Constitution and creates 
delays in bringing applications to the Constitutional Court. Furthermore 
the assignment of constitutional issues, especially human rights 
violations, to a special, elite tribunal may cause the wider public to 
view this court as 'remote from the society's core culture and average 
person 1130 • Such an elite tribunal is however justified in that South 
Africa lacks an established human rights culture and the Constitutional 
Court brings with it a platform for certainty and authoritive guidance 
on human rights issues. 
126 A provincial or local Division of the supreme court. 
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CONCLUSION 
The South African judiciary cannot hide behind notions of legal justice 
when social justice issues are addressed to it. It can also no longer 
attain j social and political legitimacy without making a substantial 
contribution to issues of social justice 131 • If due to jurisdictional 
constraints the judiciary were to be prohibited from protecting the 
fundamental rights of an individual, in a situation where the individual 
has no other legal remedies, the spirit, purport and object of the 
Constitution would dictate that the judiciary must assert itself and 
remedy the violation complained of. This was the dilemma that 
prese-nfod itself in -the c~fse ·-of Mat1so v Commanding Officer, Port 
Elizabeth Prison132 • The Court responded in activist fashion to 
safeguard the rights of the individual, notwithstanding the statutory 
prohibition on such judicial intervention. The court assumed a 
constitutional jurisdiction it did not possess in terms of the literal 
wording of the Constitution and instead relied on the values underlying 
the Bill of Rights to formulate a remedy where none existed. It is 
submitted that this approach is consonant with the bro~~--~nd 
Jj_~~r.!arian interpretation which is authorised by t_he Cof!~!i_!l.l_ti~n and is 
preferred to a judicial attitude of acquiescence and abstention from 
review. 
The Constitution by implication sanctions judicial activism and makes 
provision in .. its interpretation clause for interpretation which is both 
purposive and value-based. The purposive theory of interpretation which 
is constrained by the Constitution points to the extended and creative 
judicial review power of the judiciary under the Bill of Rights: there 
are few constitutional issues which can definitively be resolved by the 
text of the document alone133 • As a result the courts which just 
recently emerged from their previously supine judicial posturing, cannot 
afford to lapse back into judicial retinence by simply displaying fidelity 
to the constitutional text by treating it like any other statutory 
enactment. In constitutional interpretation under a bill of rights the task 
of the courts is to underpin the values of the ' Rechstaat ' by 
determining the curvatures and boundaries of the normative regime of 
rights as well as the intrinsic and substantive content of any particular 
right134 • The court in giving meaning to the underlying values of the 
Constitution, may also take into account values which are not 
mentioned eo nomine in the Bill of Rights. A value orientated and 
unqualified contextual approach to interpretation coupled with a 
131 
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measure of judicial activism is required in order to give effect to the 
underlying but sometimes inarticulate values forming part of the South 
African Bill of Rights. In so doing the meaning of the Constitution will 
be ascertained by reference to the intra- and extra-textual context, and 
result in a value-coherent and realistic interpretation. 
Under the Bill of Rights the j~diciary becomes a crucial link between 
an artificial legislative intent and the practical result of such intent. 
Prior to the enactment of the Constitution the judiciary displayed a 
reluctance to adjudicate policy considerations. This judicial reticent 
approach has to make way for a culture which recognises that 
accepted legal reasoning can and must be replaced by more value-
orientated and creative decisions. The ordinary rules of interpretation 
has to yield to an open-ended and liberal construction- or-the 
Constitution. This study does not purport to justify interpretation which 
is divorced from the text. This would result in uncertainty and raise 
problems of legitimacy. The text itself however, should be given a 
liberal meaning and not applied without full knowledge of the . scheme 
-of the Constitution as a whole. It is only when the judiciary 
recognises its creative mandate in giving practical content to the 
protection of human rights that the rubicon of functional creativity is 
crossed so as to give effect to the democratic values underlying the 
Constitution. 
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